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Access to justice and corporate accountability: a legal case study of
HudBay in Guatemala
*

Shin Imaia , Bernadette Maheandiranb and Valerie Crystala
a

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada; bSwadron Associates, Toronto,
ON, Canada
ABSTRACT This case study looks at the avenues open for addressing serious
allegations of murder, rape and assault brought by indigenous Guatemalans
against a Canadian mining company, HudBay Minerals. While ﬁrst-generation
legal and development policy reforms have facilitated foreign mining in
Guatemala, second-generation reforms have failed to address effectively conﬂicts
arising from the development projects. The judicial mechanisms available in
Guatemala are difﬁcult to access and suffer from problems of corruption and
intimidation. Relevant corporate social responsibility policies and mechanisms
lack the necessary enforcement powers. Canadian courts have been reluctant to
permit lawsuits against Canadian parent companies; however, in Choc v. HudBay
and Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, Ontario judges have allowed cases to
proceed on the merits of the case, providing an important, if limited, avenue
toward corporate accountability.
RÉSUMÉ Cette étude de cas examine les stratégies qui s’offrent pour traiter les
allégations de meurtre, de viol et d’agression formulées par des autochtones
guatémaltèques contre une compagnie minière canadienne, la HudBay Minerals.
Alors que les réformes légales et institutionnelles de « première génération » ont
facilité l’extraction minière par des compagnies étrangères, les réformes de «
deuxième génération », qui s’intéressent aux droits sociaux et aux droits de la
personne, n’offrent pas encore de mécanismes ﬁables pour résoudre les conﬂits
résultant des actions des entreprises. En effet, les règles qui déﬁnissent la
responsabilité sociale des entreprises et les jugements des mécanismes internationaux
qui interviennent lors de plaintes ne sont pas contraignants pour les états. Or, il est
très difﬁcile d’accéder aux mécanismes judiciaires du Guatemala, sans compter
qu’ils sont afﬂigés par des problèmes de corruption et d’intimidation. En outre, les
cours canadiennes ont jusqu’ici été réticentes à autoriser des actions légales
contre les compagnies mères canadiennes. Cependant, dans Choc v. HudBay et
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, la Cour supérieure ontarienne a permis ces cas a
procéder, s’il pourraient s’avérer une voie intéressante pour bien établir la
responsabilité sociale des entreprises.
Keywords: mining; Latin America; Chevron; HudBay; corporate social responsibility

Introduction
In this paper, we will examine the history of one particularly troubled nickel mine in
Guatemala, located near the town of El Estor in the region of Izabal. The mine was
born into violence, as indigenous people living on the site were removed to make room
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for the mine and the town in the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous murders, assaults, and
other human rights violations have occurred as a result of the conﬂict between local
indigenous people who have lived in the area since the late nineteenth century and the
successive Canadian corporate entities INCO, Skye Resources, and HudBay Minerals,
as well as their Guatemalan subsidiaries.
We will study the practical dimensions of this case in the context of “secondgeneration” reforms in the law and development ﬁeld that have introduced social and
human rights issues as a component of the rule of law. While ﬁrst-generation reforms
focused on judicial and institutional reforms to encourage an appropriate climate for
commercial relations, second-generation reforms introduced a number of voluntary, soft
law mechanisms to address social, environmental, and human rights aspects of
development (Trubek 2006). However, they have been criticised for being more show
than substance (Eslava 2008). Legal scholar Kerry Rittich suggests the need for speciﬁc
case studies to determine how these social aspects are faring on the ground (Rittich 2006).
We are not engaged in evaluating whether corporate social responsibility mechanisms or
judicial reforms in Guatemala have improved the conduct of individual corporations, or
judges, as the case may be; rather, we are making a more speciﬁc point, that the current
mechanisms do not provide meaningful access to justice for those who are most in need
of the protection of the law.1 Taking up Rittich’s suggestion, we describe a dispute,
centred around allegations of murder and rape, between indigenous people in the El
Estor region of Guatemala and the Canadian mining company HudBay Minerals. We
ﬁrst look at the history and context of the dispute, including a decades-long struggle over
land and resources. We believe that an understanding of the history of the conﬂict
reveals the contextual factors driving the actions of speciﬁc individuals. We take the
approach that second-generation reforms must take into account history and context
in a way that recognises the interests and rights of indigenous communities.
We then review three avenues for addressing that dispute: seeking resolution in the

Guatemalan judicial system, relying on voluntary corporate social responsibility
mechanisms, and suing in Canada. We argue that both the Guatemalan courts and
corporate social responsibility mechanisms present serious limitations with respect to
resolving claims of human rights abuses by Canadian mining companies. We are concerned
that, while Canadian companies are permitted to proﬁt from extractive activities in
foreign jurisdictions, the Canadian court system has typically not stepped in to ﬁll this
gap with respect to the effects of those activities, ﬁnding either that the cases should be
heard in foreign jurisdictions or that Canadian mining companies do not owe a duty of
care to people in foreign countries directly affected by Canadian mining.
Decisions rendered in 2013 by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and in 2014
by the Ontario Court of Appeal may be an indication that Canadian courts are prepared
to narrow this accountability gap. In the ﬁrst decision, the judge ruled that three
lawsuits ﬁled by indigenous people of El Estor against HudBay may proceed to trial,
as it is not “plain and obvious” that HudBay is not liable to the plaintiffs in negligence.
In the second decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal provided that the Ontario courts had
the jurisdiction to decide whether an Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in Ontario.
Regardless of whether these plaintiffs succeed in proving their case in either proceeding,
the openness of the court to decide on the issues based on their merits provides an
important precedent for those attempting to seek a remedy against Canadian mining
corporations’ alleged wrongs committed abroad.
We wish to point out two limitations to our methodology. First, we are only studying the
interests of the individuals who are plaintiffs in the lawsuit. While there are different
views about mining and the events in the region within the indigenous communities, we do
not purport to generalise about interests in the indigenous community as a whole. We
feel that this is a valid approach, as we are studying the availability of legal remedies to
complainants, not the dynamics of community relations. Second, we are limited by the
evidence that we have available, from court documents, newspaper reports and our own

personal knowledge of Guatemala. Consequently, while we present divergent versions
of events, we do not attempt to draw conclusions about which version is correct or
whether we have all the information; rather, we show that there are serious issues raised
that need to be resolved in a process that can make determinations of fact and, if
appropriate, provide redress.

The establishment of INCO in Guatemala2
The Canadian mining company INCO3 ﬁrst became involved in the Izabal region of
Guatemala in 1960 through Exmibal, a subsidiary established with the US-based
Hanna Mining Company (McFarlane 1989). The history of INCO in Guatemala shows
that Canadian mining interests were promoted by the Canadian government, and yet
that the Canadian government did not take the initiative to address corporate
accountability for the violence associated with these mining operations.
INCO planned to build an open pit nickel mine near the town of El Estor, located
north of Lake Izabal in the area of Izabal in eastern Guatemala. However, there were
two immediate obstacles to the realisation of INCO’s objective. First, open pit mining was
prohibited under Guatemalan law. Second, in 1960, civil war began in Guatemala and the
area around El Estor became the base of operations for guerrilla rebels (McFarlane 1989).
INCO was able to surmount these difﬁculties through negotiations with Guatemala’s
military government. INCO hired an engineer to rewrite the mining code, and this
revised version was accepted by Guatemala’s Congress (McFarlane 1989). The
resulting mining code of April 1965 speciﬁcally allowed for “open sky mining”
(Driever 1985, 34). The company also received a 40-year lease to mine an area of 385
km2 near El Estor as well as “generous tax concessions”. Finally, the military government
provided INCO with the understanding that it would guarantee “stability” in the region
(McFarlane 1989, 127).

Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio4 was responsible for clearing the indigenous people out
of the INCO region in Zacapa-Lake Izabal in the late 1960s and 1970s (McFarlane
1989; Bradbury 1985). The indigenous people of Izabal were largely Mayan Q’eqchi’,
who had migrated to the area from the highlands of Verapaz in the late nineteenth
century (Grandia 2006). During this “reign of terror”, the number of people killed is
estimated to be between 3,000 and 6,000 (McFarlane 1989, 127). At the same time, Canada
showed ongoing support for the El Estor project, as the Canadian ambassador to Guatemala,
S. F. Rae, went on a well-publicised tour of the mine site in 1968 (McFarlane 1989).
There was strong opposition to the Exmibal project from indigenous people and
other concerned Guatemalans. A group of professors from the School of Economic
Sciences at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, took up the cause and
established a commission in 1969 (McFarlane 1989). The commission concluded that
the Guatemalan government had not negotiated sufﬁcient beneﬁts from the project and
that Exmibal would simply strip Guatemala of its riches (Driever 1985, 36). Public
protests against the mine followed. Carlos Arana, who had become President of
Guatemala, responded by suspending the constitutional right to assembly and arresting
large numbers of people. The army occupied the university in an attempt to silence
the opposition from the nation’s intellectual community. State death squads assassinated
two law professors and members of the commission, Julio Camey Herrera and Adolfo
Mijangos López. One other member of the commission was wounded in an
assassination attempt and another was forced to ﬂee the country due to death threats
(Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999; Bradbury 1985). The UN Commission on Historical
Clariﬁcation (the Truth Commission) later found that these crimes were committed by
state authorities in retaliation for opposition to the government’s policies (Guatemalan
Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999).
In February 1971, an exploitation agreement was signed between INCO and the
Guatemalan government. Major construction began on the El Estor mine in 1974

(Driever 1985), aided by a CAD20 million loan from the Canadian Export Development
Corporation (Toronto Star, April 15, 1979). The UN Commission documented
violence associated with the mine during this period. In 1978, two people in El Estor
were shot and wounded by men riding in an Exmibal truck (Guatemalan Commission
for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, 679). The next month, employees of Exmibal were
involved in the execution of four people in the municipality of Panzós, near El Estor
(Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, 105). In 1981, police ofﬁcers
riding in an Exmibal truck killed community leader Pablo Bac Caal (Guatemalan
Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation 1999, 674).
In 1982, the market value of nickel was declining while the cost of oil was rising. As a
result, INCO shut down the El Estor mine. While the mine lay dormant, violence in
Guatemala continued. The most serious human rights violations were perpetrated under
the dictator Rios Montt. There were 192 massacres in 1982 alone.5 Despite condemning
these human rights violations in Guatemala in 1983, the Canadian government
participated in negotiations to sell military planes to the Guatemalan air force. The
Guatemalan military had been known to use their planes to shoot at indigenous
villages (Lemco 1986).
In 1996, the Guatemalan government signed a peace accord with the guerrillas, ending
the 36year civil war. According to a 1998 report by Monsignor Juan Gerardi, which
evaluated evidence and testimony of 600 people collected from across Guatemala over
three years, 150,000 people were murdered, 50,000 disappeared and 1 million were
displaced during the civil war (Gerardi 1998). In a 1999 report, Guatemala: Memories
of Silence, the UN Commission found that the state, in some capacity, was responsible
for 93 per cent of the human rights violations that occurred during the war and that
the state had “committed acts of genocide against groups of the Maya people” (United
Nations 2002, 2).

The Fenix project
In 2004, a Canadian company called Skye Resources purchased the mine at El Estor. At
that time, the mine came to be known as “Fenix” and was to be operated by Skye’s
Guatemalan subsidiary, Compañia Guatemalteca de Níquel (CGN). As INCO’s
original mining concession from the 1960s was set to expire, the Guatemalan
government granted a licence for mining exploration at El Estor on 13 December 2004
(International Labour Organization 2007, 40). According to a committee of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), despite the fact that indigenous people had
not yet formalised their rights of ownership and possession with respect to the land in
question, the Guatemalan government had an obligation under ILO Convention No.
169 to consult with the affected indigenous people prior to granting the licence, which it
had failed to do (International Labour Organization 2007, paragraphs 48–51).
The Mayan Q’eqchi’ farmers in the Izabal region gradually began to occupy or reoccupy
lands in El Estor that had been cleared of indigenous people for the mine in the 1960s and
1970s. New settlements were formed on these lands, including the community of Barrio
Revolución, and other communities, such as La Unión, were reoccupied (Paley 2007).
Skye Resources referred to the reoccupation of the El Estor region as “land invasions”
(Skye Resources 2007). Because of Skye Resources’ belief that it had the exclusive right
to occupy the area, court orders were obtained to remove the “squatters”.6 On 8 and 9
January 2007, hundreds of armed police ofﬁcers and members of the military conducted
forced evictions of ﬁve communities in the El Estor region, including Barrio Unión, La
Pista, Barrio Revolución, Barrio La Paz and Lote Ocho (Paley 2007; Caal v. HudBay
2011). During the evictions, people’s homes were destroyed and some were burned
(Paley 2007).
According to Skye Resources, “a peaceful atmosphere” was maintained during the
evictions (Skye Resources 2007). President and CEO Ian Austin admitted that homes
were burned, but claimed that the burning of homes was not caused by company people

(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). He stated that the company remained
committed to “continue [its] discussions on matters of concern with the local communities
in the El Estor region” (Skye Resources 2007). According to allegations in court
documents, another set of evictions occurred on 17 January 2007. During these evictions,
11 Mayan women of Lote Ocho were allegedly gang raped by police, military and
Fenix security personnel. The women say that they were trapped by security personnel as
they were attempting to leave their homes, and then raped by groups of men, including
members of the Fenix security team, who were wearing uniforms bearing the initials
CGN. Two of the women were pregnant at the time of the alleged rapes, and
subsequently miscarried their unborn children (Caal v. HudBay 2011). CGN denies that
these rapes occurred; according to the company, police reports show that no “illegal
occupiers” were even present at the evictions on the date of the alleged rapes (HudBay
Minerals, n.d.).
The Fenix mine changed ownership again in 2008, when HudBay Minerals
purchased Skye Resources, changing the name to HMI Nickel (HudBay Minerals
2008a, 2008b). HudBay announced that it did not plan to begin construction at the
Fenix site until market conditions became more favourable (HudBay Minerals
2008b). During this time, some of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ people returned once again to
the disputed land.
In 2009, nickel was rising in price, and the company began considering spending the
CAD1 billion necessary to open the mine (Grainger 2009).7 On 27 September 2009, there
were protests against mining activities in several communities located near the Fenix
mine, including the communities of La Unión and Las Nubes. In the violence that day
seven people were shot, resulting in the death of community leader and school teacher
Adolfo Ich Chamón, and serious injury to another community member, German Chub
Choc. Five security guards were also injured.
The events that led up to the violence are in dispute. According to one version of

events, the governor of Izabal, along with 50 CGN security guards, entered the
community of Las Nubes to discuss resettlement of the community (Behrens 2009). These
discussions lasted for a few hours, but did not lead to an agreement. In response to CGN’s
presence, community members organised protests to assert their right to remain on the
land. Adolfo Ich’s family claims that protests were sparked by the “intrusion of Fenix
security personnel into Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities” and “fears of renewed forced and
violent evictions” (Choc v. HudBay 2010, paragraph 51). Residents of La Unión joined
those of Las Nubes in a march toward the town of El Estor to denounce “illegal
evictions” and to gather support for their cause (Rodriguez 2009). At around three in
the afternoon, security guards reportedly opened ﬁre on community members, wounding
eight people (Behrens 2009). According to the Ich family’s statement of claim, Adolfo
Ich was in his home in La Unión when he heard gunshots being ﬁred. He left his
home to see what was going on and if he could help restore the calm (Choc v. HudBay
2010). As he was a respected community leader, he was apparently recognised by
security personnel. The claim states that he was unarmed when he was surrounded by
a dozen armed CGN security guards who beat him, dragged him away and severed
his arm with a machete. The head of CGN security, Mynor Padilla, is alleged to
have shot him in the head. Padilla is a former high-ranking ofﬁcer in the Guatemalan
military.
An alternative version of events is provided by HudBay. According to the company,
authorities were attempting to “peacefully resolv[e] illegal occupations through
dialogue”

when “organised protestors” attacked departing government vehicles

(HudBay Minerals 2009). HudBay claims that the protestors stole automatic ﬁrearms
and other weapons from the police station and attacked a community hospital that had
been sponsored by CGN. HudBay acknowledges that a protestor died that day; however,
it claims that “CGN personnel were not involved with his death” (HudBay Minerals,
n.d.). HudBay suggested that Adolfo Ich died as a result of a “confrontation among the

protestors” (HudBay Minerals 2009). The company expressed its commitment to
working with residents to arrive at a “fair and equitable solution to the land claims and
resettlement”. Regardless of which version of events is believed, the incident highlights
the ongoing tensions occurring in the area as a result of unsettled land claims.

The three cases from El Estor
Members of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities around the Fenix mine are bringing three
related lawsuits in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the Canadian mining
company HudBay Minerals. The ﬁrst lawsuit was commenced on 24 September 2010 by
the widow of Adolfo Ich Chamán, who was killed during the protests around El Estor in
September 2009. As discussed above, the claim alleges that Adolfo Ich was “hacked
and shot to death by private security forces employed by [CGN] near his home in El
Estor, Guatemala” (Choc v. HudBay 2010, paragraph 1).
The claim made by Adolfo Ich’s widow is that HudBay, both in Canada and
Guatemala, was negligent in deploying security forces into the community of La Unión
and in authorising the use of excessive force in response to the peaceful opposition, despite
the corporation’s knowledge that the security personnel were unlicensed, using illegal
weapons and had in the past used unreasonable violence against local Mayan populations.
Furthermore, the allegation is that HudBay continued to employ under-trained and
inadequately supervised security personnel and, regardless of public commitments to the
contrary, failed to implement or enforce adequate standards of conduct and oversight,
which would have prevented the murder of Adolfo Ich.
On the same day that Adolfo Ich was shot, German Chub was shot, allegedly by the
same mine company security personnel (Chub v. HudBay 2011). The then 21-year-old
single father has been left a paraplegic by the shooting and has lost the use of his
right lung. He had not been involved in any protests on that day but was watching a
football game at a community football ﬁeld and was shot without provocation. On 26

October 2011, Chub commenced a lawsuit against HudBay Minerals and CGN,
similarly

alleging

that

the

violence

against

him

was caused by negligent

authorisation of the deployment of heavily armed security personnel into Mayan
Q’eqchi’ communities on 27 September 2009.
The ﬁnal lawsuit against the corporation relates to the forcible evictions of the
community of Lote Ocho that took place in January 2007, as discussed above. Eleven
women – Luisa Caal Chun, Margarita Caal Caal, Rosa Elbira Coc Ich, Olivia Asig
Xol, Amalia Cac Tiul, Lucia Caal Chun, Carmelina Caal Ical, Irma Yolanda Choc Cac,
Elvira Choc Chub, Elena Choc Quib and Irma Yolanda Choc Quib – have
commenced an action against HudBay Minerals and HMI Nickel for the alleged
gang rapes by uniformed mining company security personnel, police, and military
during the forceful expulsion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ families (Caal v. HudBay 2011).
The claim alleges that the security forces who committed the rapes were under the
control and direction of Canadian mining company Skye Resources, which sought the
forced eviction in order to clear the land of the indigenous communities for its Fenix mining
project. The claim asserts that HudBay’s 2008 purchase of and merger with Skye
Resources (renamed HMI Nickel) makes HudBay responsible for the past legal
wrongs and liabilities of Skye Resources. The lawsuit alleges that the harm suffered by
the plaintiffs was caused by the negligence of Skye Resources in failing to direct and
supervise its security personnel, knowing that they lacked the licence required under
Guatemalan law, and authorising the forced evictions without taking reasonable steps to
control violence against the community, although it made public representations to the
contrary.
In September 2011, HudBay sold the Fenix mine and all of its Guatemalan assets to
Solway Investment Group, a private company with a head ofﬁce in Cyprus (HudBay
Minerals 2011). While HudBay had purchased the mine for CAD446 million, it was sold
for only CAD76 million (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). The lawsuits against

HudBay are proceeding despite the sale (Klippensteins, n.d.).
On 22 July 2013, Justice Carole J. Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
rejected three preliminary motions ﬁled by HudBay and allowed the three cases to
proceed to trial. We will come back to the discussion of this case below, in the section
“The courts in Canada”.

The context for judicial decision making in Guatemala
The plaintiffs in the three El Estor cases have decided to pursue their claims against
HudBay in Canadian courts rather than in Guatemala. There is good reason for Canadian
courts to hear cases like these on their merits, given the context for judicial decision
making in Guatemala. This section will outline the state of impunity in Guatemala, as
expressed by international bodies, and will then provide an example of a case that
made its way through the Guatemalan courts, to illustrate the difﬁculties faced by
plaintiffs who wish to receive a fair trial in a claim against the interests of foreign mining
companies.
According to a 2009 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of
judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, the Guatemalan justice system is afﬂicted by a
general climate of impunity for violent crimes and human rights abuses:

the prevalence of impunity in Guatemala has a number of causes, the main ones being a
variety of structural factors and the violence to which justice professionals are subjected [
… ]. The existing system is open to external interference and is highly politicised, and this
has a negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. (United Nations 2009a, 1)

Similarly, the 2012 Human Rights Report on Guatemala prepared by the US Department of
State asserts that the Guatemalan judicial system has failed to “ensure full and timely

investigations and fair trials” and to “protect judicial sector ofﬁcials, witnesses, and civil
society representatives from intimidation” (US Department of State 2012, 1). It notes that
judges, prosecutors, plaintiffs and witnesses “continued to report threats, intimidation,
and surveillance” (US Department of State 2012, 7).
This situation has improved to some degree since the establishment of the UN-backed
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG); however, the UN
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions cautions that
“neither Guatemala nor the international community should fall into the trap of seeing
CICIG as ‘the’ solution to Guatemala’s failing criminal justice system” (United Nations
2009b, 12) and the US Department of State report observes that “impunity continue[d] to
be widespread” despite the efforts of the CICIG (US Department of State 2012, 1).8
As an illustration, we describe a case from Guatemala’s Constitutional Court in which
the claimants were required to pursue an excessive number of judicial proceedings in
order to obtain a remedy for a relatively simple problem involving formal title to
communal property. The community of Agua Caliente Lote Nueve located near the Fenix
project in El Estor complained that CGN was illegally exploring on its land and said that
mining personnel moved boundary stones and made exploration holes, which affected
the

community’s

water

(Constitutional

Court

2011).9 The community asked

Fontierras10 to conﬁrm that the community of Lote Nueve had title to its land. There
was a problem with this request, and the resolution to this problem reveals much
about the judicial system and its potential inﬂuences.
Under a land reform statute, communities were able to purchase land to hold under
communal title. The community in this case began paying for the land in 1985 and was
awarded provisional title, conditional on completing the scheduled payments. They made
the ﬁnal payment on 18 July 2002. In 2004 the mine was being transferred from INCO
to Skye Resources. On 2 July 2004, Fontierras informed the community that the
registry book had been damaged in 1998 and that the pages of the registry that

contained their title were missing. Fontierras told the community that they would have
to go to court to obtain an order to replace the pages.
The same year, the community went to the Ninth Judge of the Civil Trial Court.11 Their
case was rejected because the judge held that the community had begun the wrong
process for the remedy that they were seeking. The community then went to the Tenth
Judge of the Civil Trial Court, but were rejected because the document certifying the
legal status of the representative was illegible. The community returned to the Tenth
Judge, who then found that there was no certiﬁcation that the land claimed was the land that
was referred to in the missing pages. In 2007, the community again appealed to Fontierras
for assistance. They were rebuffed a second time, and told that they needed to obtain a
judicial order. When the community returned to court, this time the Sixth Judge of the
Civil Trial Court, their case was dismissed because the community had failed to provide
proof that the missing pages referred to the land that they were claiming. The community
returned to Fontierras to ask them to replace the pages, and they were told a third time
that a court order was necessary. Finally, the community began a constitutional
proceeding, arguing that their constitutional rights had been violated through the refusal of
Fontierras to conﬁrm their title.
The constitutional application was heard at the ﬁrst level by the Court of Appeals on
15 February 2010. This was a year after HudBay started considering reactivating the mine
and had been trying remove indigenous occupants from lands needed for the mine. The
judge found that the community already had title conﬁrmed on 17 February 2004 and
that Fontierras had replaced the missing pages, pursuant to an order from the Fifth Judge
of the Civil Trial Court on 20 December 2004. Consequently, there was no basis for the
proceeding. The judge ordered costs against the community and ﬁned the lawyer 1,000
quetzales (approximately CAD143) for bringing the proceeding. The history of Lote
Nueve, as recounted by the judge of the Court of Appeals, is completely different from the
story we have recounted above, in which Lote Nueve did not have the missing pages

replaced and were being shunted back and forth between the courts and Fontierras. This is
because the judge of the Court of Appeals based his decision on the documents from
another community, Agua Caliente Sexan Lote Once.
The community of Lote Nueve appealed this decision, and was able to present its case
to the Constitutional Court in 2010. Lawyers for Fontierras and for CGN intervened to
ask the Constitutional Court to uphold a decision that was clearly based on mistaken
documents. Fortunately for the community, the Constitutional Court found in their
favour, and conﬁrmed that the Court of Appeals had relied on mistaken documents. The
Constitutional Court reviewed documents that conﬁrmed that the provisional title had
been awarded in 1985 and documents that conﬁrmed that the ﬁnal payment had been
made in 2002. The judges of the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the
only step remaining was the administrative act of conﬁrming title. The Court then
ordered that the missing pages be replaced, conﬁrming community title to the land. It
was unnecessary, then, for land title to be thrown into limbo for seven years when the
evidence that fulﬁlled the conditions for title was readily available. It is interesting that
the missing pages were noticed at around the same time as exploration was taking place
on the land in question and as the mine was being sold by INCO to Skye Resources.
Without more facts, we do not know whether CGN played an active role in the
circumstances surrounding Lote Nueve’s title, but we do know that HudBay had an interest
in the outcome of the hearing at the Constitutional Court, as lawyers for CGN intervened
and argued that the community of Lote Nueve should not have their title conﬁrmed. As
of May 2013, two years after the Constitutional Court decision, the
missing pages in the registry have not been replaced.

We do not argue that it is impossible to obtain a fair trial for a claim against the
interests of a mining company within the Guatemalan justice system. Nevertheless,
the barriers faced by plaintiffs who wish to sue mining companies in Guatemala are

signiﬁcant, and they are compounded by the difﬁculty in retaining a lawyer for cases
such as these. The Lote Nueve case, for example, was supported by Leo Crippa, a
lawyer for the Washington-based Indian Law Resource Centre.
A further problem exists in respect to the availability of remedies. A decision of a
court in Guatemala against CGN alone will not reach the conduct of executives in
Canada, or the assets of the Canadian parent. Even if a Guatemalan court were to
make an order against the parent company, HudBay Minerals, enforcement would
have to be transferred to a court in Canada, where further litigation could take place,
challenging the original decision in

Guatemala. This would further lengthen an

already arduous process and render it prohibitively expensive.

Corporate social responsibility
If claimants such as those from El Estor are unable to obtain a fair trial in the Guatemalan
courts, it might be suggested that corporate social responsibility (CSR) mechanisms
adopted by mining companies can provide appropriate redress. We argue in this section
that the voluntary nature of CSR and the lack of enforcement mechanisms make it an
inadequate forum for resolving cases in which there are allegations of serious human
rights abuses and signiﬁcant factual discrepancies between the positions of the claimants
and those of the company.
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in, and adoption of, CSR polices
by the mining industry (Dashwood 2012; Sagebien and Lindsay 2011). The establishment
of the United Nations’ “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” framework
(“Ruggie Principles”) has provided further impetus to develop standards of behaviour that
address a company’s impact on the environment and local communities (United Nations
2011).
HudBay heavily promotes its commitment to CSR. Its website shows that it has
internal policies on human rights, the environment, and business ethics. It has also adopted

a number of external instruments, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, n.d.), the Global
Reporting Initiative (Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.), and the “Toward Sustainable
Mining” framework of the Mining Association of Canada (Mining Association of
Canada 2011). Each year, HudBay publishes an attractive 50page Corporate Social
Responsibility Report, setting out its accomplishments (HudBay Minerals 2012).
We do not propose to describe and analyse each of these CSR policies, nor do we
wish to suggest that HudBay is being disingenuous in adopting these standards.
Rather, we wish to show that the policies will not serve as an adequate mechanism for
addressing the issues raised by the Guatemalan plaintiffs.
The 2012 Corporate Social Responsibility Report lists four “avenues available to
people who wish to register concern about HudBay’s activities” (HudBay Minerals 2012,
13). The ﬁrst two avenues provide phone numbers and a website to the Board or a
Committee of the Board to register a concern. In the case of the Guatemalan plaintiffs, this
avenue would not have been fruitful for serious criminal charges, as HudBay released a
press release saying that its own investigations had shown that “a protestor died” but that
company personnel were not involved; and that rapes did not take place (HudBay
Minerals, n.d.). HudBay maintains this position despite the arrest of their head of security,
Mynor Padilla, in 2012 for the murder of Adolfo Ich Chamán (Prensa Libre 2012). Given
that HudBay had already publicly declared its own ﬁndings of fact, the plaintiffs would
not expect to have a fair hearing from HudBay.
The third avenue of redress suggested by HudBay is the federal government’s
Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. In 2009, Canada’s federal government
released a policy called “Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the
International Extractive Sector”, which established the Ofﬁce of the Extractive Sector
Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. The CSR Counsellor does not have any
signiﬁcant powers. She can only act when there has been a complaint; a process can be

instituted only with the agreement of the corporation; she cannot offer determinations as to
whether harm has occurred; she cannot investigate the complaints; and she cannot issue
binding recommendations to the corporations (Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
The limitations of the process are clearly illustrated in a complaint about labour practices
that was lodged against a Canadian mining company, Excellon Resources Inc., in
Mexico. The CSR Counsellor found that the Mexican workers were “eager to engage
in a good faith dialogue”, but Excellon unilaterally withdrew from the process after
six months. This brought the process to an abrupt end (CSR Counsellor 2011). In
fact, in all three of the cases in which the CSR Counsellor was ready to begin
mediation, the process ended when the mining company decided to withdraw from the
process. For the Guatemalan plaintiffs, the most that the CSR Counsellor could do
would be to try to convene a meeting, but she would be powerless to require HudBay
to participate. Even if HudBay agreed to participate, she would not be able to
investigate what happened or provide compensation if there was wrongdoing.
The ﬁnal mechanism suggested by HudBay is the National Contact Point of the
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). The OECD has
developed Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which state that corporations should
“respect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their activities”
(OECD 2011, 19). In order to implement the Guidelines, the OECD Council created a
system of National Contact Points (NCPs) in 2000; these are typically government
ofﬁcials in each of the member states. The role of the NCP is to facilitate inquiries and
discussions between corporations and affected communities on all matters covered by the
Guidelines. The NCP has some capacity to investigate complaints directly by seeking
information from parties to the dispute and can attempt to mediate between the parties
to come to a resolution. Neither the resolution nor the statement is binding on the
corporation or enforceable by state governments. The NCP does have fact-ﬁnding
powers, but these are not commonly used. The NCP does not have the power to award

compensation. If there is no resolution, the NCP can review the evidence, consult experts,
make a determination and issue a statement on the case (OECD 2011).
None of these mechanisms suggested by HudBay provide an effective method for
investigating whether the allegations are true, for ascertaining responsibility, or for
awarding penalties or redress. For this reason, we turn in the next section to the
Canadian courts as the remaining potential avenue to fairly resolve the dispute between
the plaintiffs from El Estor and HudBay.

The courts in Canada
Having a case decided in a Canadian court has the advantage of producing an
enforceable decision. A judgment against the parent company, HudBay, could result in
payments to the plaintiffs and could shed light on the conduct of the executives.
Judges in Canada have had several opportunities to address concerns about the
activities of mining companies with operations abroad. They have articulated three
principles that create barriers to bringing a case in Canada: lack of jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens and lack of duty of care.12
We will discuss each of these principles in the context of a case against a transnational
mining company and then explain how these principles play out in the lawsuits from El
Estor.

Jurisdiction
On 8 November 2010, the Canadian Association Against Impunity brought a class action
against Anvil Mining Ltd. in Quebec for the corporation’s actions relating to a massacre
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Mining Watch 2010). Anvil Mining
was headquartered in Perth, Australia, but opened a small ofﬁce in Montreal in 2005.
Its primary activity was the exploration of a mine located 55 kilometres from Kilwa in
the DRC (Association Canadienne Contre L’impunité (ACCI) c Anvil Mining Ltd. 2011).

On 13 October 2004, a small group of approximately 10 armed individuals from
neighbouring Zambia, claiming to act on behalf of the Revolutionary Movement for the
Liberation of Katanga, entered Kilwa. The government of the DRC ordered army
ofﬁcers to remove the men and to regain control of Kilwa. A UN mission in the
DRC subsequently documented the army’s human rights violations against the people
of Kilwa perpetrated during the counterattack (Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo 2005). According to the mission’s report, 73 civilians were killed and a large
percentage of the population was displaced as they ﬂed the counterattack. Twenty-eight
people were reported to have been summarily executed based on suspicions that they
supported the insurgents.
The mission’s report stated that Anvil provided support to the military during the
events by providing its planes to transport troops to Kilwa and providing trucks,
drivers, fuel and food rations to the army. It also stated that the managing director of
Anvil Mining admitted in an interview with an Australian television station that the
corporation provided logistics to the army.
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the action on the basis that the Court had no
jurisdiction. It found that at the time of the massacre there was no Anvil activity or ofﬁce
in Quebec and that, in any event, the dispute was not substantially connected to Anvil’s
work in Quebec. The Court did not apply the forum of necessity exception, which permits
the Court to assume jurisdiction where there is a sufﬁcient connection to the jurisdiction
and proceedings could not possibly or reasonably be instituted outside Quebec (Civil Code
of Quebec, article 3136). The Court found that the claim against Anvil could be heard in
Australia, the corporate headquarters, and that victims could bring their case before the
courts in the DRC, although attempts to try the cases in those jurisdictions before had
been unsuccessful.
Anvil’s overall revenue for the DRC rose from USD29 million in 2004 to almost
USD69 million in 2005 (Anvil 2005).

Although in ACCI c. Anvil Mining Ltd the courts declined to exercise jurisdiction to
adjudicate a tort that had been committed outside of Canada, in Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corporation Ontario courts considered the related issue of whether they should exercise
jurisdiction to enforce a judgment that had been obtained outside Canada (Yaiguaje v.
Chevron Corporation 2013).
The underlying dispute was between 47 plaintiffs – representing approximately
30,000 residents of Sucumbíos province in Ecuador – and Chevron, an American
corporation incorporated in Delaware. The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco, which
subsequently merged with Chevron, severely polluted the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador
during its activities between 1972 and 1990. The plaintiffs brought an action before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1993, which was
eventually dismissed. As a condition of dismissal, Texaco committed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court when a claim was brought in that jurisdiction.
On 11 February 2011, the trial court in Ecuador found that Chevron was liable for
approximately USD18 billion. In 2013, the highest appellate court in Ecuador, the Court
of Cassation, reduced the damages on appeal to USD9.51 billion.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs have not been able enforce the judgment. Chevron
continues to contend that the trial judgment was obtained by fraud and corruption by the
plaintiffs’ counsel. In 2011, a New York District Court granted Chevron a global antienforcement injunction, barring the enforcement of the judgment. This injunction was
overturned on appeal (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation 2013, C.A., paragraphs 5–13).
In 2012, the plaintiffs brought an action in Ontario, seeking recognition and
enforcement of the judgment against the assets of Chevron and its Canadian subsidiary,
Chevron Canada Limited (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation 2013, Ont. Sup. Ct.,
paragraph 3). The defendants, Chevron and Chevron Canada, did not ﬁle statements of
defence but instead challenged the jurisdiction of the court to enforce the judgment. In
other words, Chevron argued that the Ecuadorians should be barred from the Ontario

justice system. The Ontario Court of Appeal was clearly irritated by the position taken by
Chevron. Mr Justice MacPherson pointed out the shifting positions taken by Chevron in
various court proceedings:

For 20 years, Chevron has contested the legal proceedings of every court involved in this
litigation – in the United States, Ecuador and Canada [ … ]. In these circumstances, the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian
judgment in a court where Chevron will have to respond on the merits. (Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corporation 2013, C.A., paragraphs 69 and 70)

The Court of Appeal found that Ontario courts could hear the case and hear arguments
from both sides about whether or not the Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in
Canada.
Chevron has since sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Supreme
Court of Canada 2014) and has continued ﬁghting the case in the USA. In March 2014, a
US District Court Judge found that the plaintiffs’ counsel had engaged in fraud and
corruption in order to obtain the Ecuadorian judgment. Although the US decision does not
bar the enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment in Canada, or in Brazil and Argentina
(where the plaintiffs have also sought enforcement), it may cause the Ontario courts
“to take a second look at the enforceability of the Ecuador judgment” if there was
fraud (Krauss 2014). However, the ﬁnding of fraud could only be made if Chevron
agrees to bring itself under the jurisdiction of the Ontario court to argue on the merits
that the judgment should not be enforced against it. Thus Chevron appears to be in a
difﬁcult position. If it continues to argue that Ontario courts do not have jurisdiction
to hear the case by the Ecuadorians, then it will not be able to argue in a Canadian court
that the Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent. If Chevron wishes to argue that the
Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent in a Canadian court, it will have to agree that the

Ecuadorians also have the right to have their case heard in Canada.

Forum non conveniens
As noted above, even when a court accepts jurisdiction, the defendant company can
assert that there is a more appropriate forum for the claim can be heard. In 1998, a
class action was brought in Quebec against Canadian mining corporation Cambior
Inc. by a group of 23,000 victims represented by a public interest group, Recherches
Internationales Québec. The claim alleged that a failed tailings dam leaked 2.3
billion litres of liquid containing cyanide and heavy metals into the Esequibo River
in Guyana on 19 August 1995. Justice Maughan, who was hearing the case, described
the leak as one of the worst environmental disasters in gold mining history
(Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc 1998).
The action was dismissed without being heard on the merits. The Quebec Superior
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction but applied the legal doctrine of forum non conveniens
codiﬁed in Quebec’s civil code. The Court based its decision on the fact that Guyana was
the location of the spill, the location of many of the witnesses and victims, the location in
which the damage was suffered and that Guyanese law would apply to the incident.
Furthermore, the Court noted that its decision not to hear the case did not deny the victims
justice, since “Guyana’s judicial system would provide the victims with a fair and
impartial hearing”. It rejected the claim that “the administration of justice is in such a
state of disarray that it would constitute an injustice to the victims to have their case
litigated in Guyana” (Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc. 1998,
paragraph 12). The victims did pursue their claim in Guyana’s courts, but due to failure to
ﬁle an afﬁdavit, in 2006 the action was struck by the High Court of the Supreme Court
of Judicature of Guyana and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the company’s legal
costs (CNN Money 2006). Cambior continued to operate proﬁtably until 2005, when

the mine was exhausted (Ramraj, n.d.; Cambior 2004).

Duty of care
A component of establishing that a mining company is responsible for human rights abuses
is the existence of a legal obligation to take reasonable care in the conduct of mining
operations that could foreseeably harm the interests of the claimants. In Canada and in
many other common law jurisdictions, duty of care is established when the court
determines that: the harm suffered is “reasonably foreseeable” as a result of the
defendant’s conduct; and there is a relationship of “proximity” between the defendant
and the claimant, such that the defendant should be required to contemplate the
claimant’s legitimate interests when acting (Donoghue v. Stevenson 1932).
In the context of transnational corporations, there are several obstacles to ﬁnding
such a relationship. Owing to legal requirements of the country in which the mining is
taking place or in order to avoid ﬁnancial liability, a subsidiary of the parent corporation
is often incorporated in the country of operations to conduct the extraction or
production of the mineral resource. The subsidiary is in charge of day-to-day operations
on the ground, which often include hiring and training employees, conducting
exploration and maintaining the mine. Where third parties, such as private security
companies hired by subsidiary corporations, commit violence, it may be difﬁcult to
impute their wrongdoing to the parent corporation. The difﬁculty in establishing duty of
care was evidenced by the suit commenced in 2008 against two of the directors of
Copper Mesa, a Canadian mining company in Ecuador, as well as the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX). The claimants, Ecuadorian campesinos from areas adjacent to
Junin, where Copper Mesa attempted to carry out exploration activities, opposed the
proposed mine (Klippensteins 2009, paragraphs 13–15). Prior to Copper Mesa being
listed on the TSX, the mayor of the county informed the TSX of the opposition to
the mine in the community and the likelihood of violence.

On 2 December 2006, a large group of armed security forces confronted members of the
Junin community and sprayed pepper spray directly into the eyes of one of the claimants.
The security forces then shot into the crowd, injuring another of the claimants. A
representative of the community met with the Copper Mesa directors on 27 April 2007 to
advise them of the confrontation and risk of violence. However, the violence continued.
One of the plaintiffs was alleged to have received death threats in June 2007 and one
month later was allegedly attacked by a mob led by afﬁliates of the corporation, who
assaulted him with sticks and rocks before the police intervened (Klippensteins 2009).13
The Ontario Court of Appeal found insufﬁcient evidence to hold the Copper Mesa
directors personally liable, upholding the determination of the lower court that the
directors did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs as there was no direct connection
between acts or omissions of the directors and the harm caused to the plaintiffs. The
Court held that the circumstances in which directors could be held personally liable for
negligence for the acts of the corporation were limited and were not met in this case.
The Court found that the defendants had only recently become directors when the
representative of the community advised them of the potential violence, and it was not
claimed that the directors directly operated the Copper Mesa entities or authorised the
violence, nor was it speciﬁed how the policies and practices of the corporation led to
violence. The Court was not sympathetic to the argument that the directors had been
informed and that silence from the directors in the face of the violence amounted to tacit
approval of the violence against the plaintiffs (Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining
Corporation 2011).
In the HudBay case, the company did not contest the fact that Ontario courts had
jurisdiction to hear the case. However, HudBay initially argued that the case should be
heard in Guatemala based on forum non conveniens. They abruptly dropped this ground
of objection shortly before a hearing on the matter (Klippensteins, n.d.). In the end,
HudBay relied on the third ground: the lack of duty of care. In other words, even if the

allegations of murder and rape by their security forces were true, HudBay would not be
responsible because the parent did not have a duty of care to community members in
Guatemala. Therefore, HudBay argued, there would be no purpose in having a trial.
The Ontario Superior Court rejected this argument, ﬁnding that it was not “plain and
obvious” that the actions would not succeed. In doing so, the Court has acknowledged
that parent companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent
harm caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct
control by the Canadian parent corporation” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraph 73).
The Court found that the plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven at trial, could
establish the elements of foreseeability and proximity necessary to establish a duty of care.
The Court stated that acts such as “requesting a forced eviction of a community using
hundreds of security personnel” and “authorising the use of force in response to peaceful
opposition from the local community” would make it reasonably foreseeable to
HudBay/Skye that violence would result, including “raping the plaintiffs” and “killing
Adolfo Ich and seriously injuring German Chub” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraphs 63–
64). The Court found that HudBay’s public commitment to maintaining a relationship with
local communities is a factor in ﬁnding that a relationship of proximity may be
established at trial.
Because this decision is the result of a preliminary proceeding only, the existence of a
duty of care will have to be established at trial. However, it is important to note that
HudBay has decided not to appeal this preliminary decision and the case will proceed to
be tried on its merits.

Access to justice
A resolution of conﬂict between mining corporations and communities does not
automatically require a judicial determination in the Canadian courts. In fact, some
aspects of the El Estor cases make judicial resolution impractical. For example, threats of

violence to potential plaintiffs and witnesses can prevent evidence from being brought
forward, regardless of whether a case is heard in Canada or in the jurisdiction in which the
alleged incidents occurred. There is also a signiﬁcant difﬁculty when the plaintiffs have
limited access to funds to retain counsel. Additionally, the present cases against HudBay
will not resolve underlying political issues such as the decadeslong dispute over land
rights. Nevertheless, due to signiﬁcant shortcomings of other dispute resolution
mechanisms, a Canadian judicial determination on the merits may be the only practical
way, at the present time, to resolve issues raised in the El Estor cases. The court system in
Guatemala would likely not be reliable, as the judicial system in Guatemala appears “open
to external interference and is highly politicised” (United Nations 2009a, 2), and the
outcome of a judicial process could be inﬂuenced by mining interests. The Lote Nueve
case, plagued by troubling administrative delays, indicates the signiﬁcant barriers faced
by mine-affected plaintiffs. In any event, a decision against a Guatemalan subsidiary
may not effect the necessary change in the parent company’s practices, or be sufﬁcient
to impose the rule of law on Canadian executives.
CSR mechanisms are not adequate for resolving serious allegations of human rights
abuses against Canadian mining companies. Mechanisms coordinated by the mining
company are ineffective when the company disputes the basic facts alleged by the
complainants. Mechanisms coordinated by a third party, such as the Corporate Social
Responsibility Counsellor or the National Contact Points of the OECD, are voluntary and
not enforceable. Given the limitations of alternative mechanisms for resolving these
disputes, there is a lack of adequate accountability measures with respect to Canadian
mining companies with operations in other jurisdictions. We ﬁnd it contradictory that
proﬁts can travel freely from Guatemala to Canada, while the Canadian beneﬁciaries are
not held responsible for how that money is raised or for activities undertaken to produce
the proﬁts. Canadian courts do have the ability to ﬁll the void. As demonstrated by the
cases of Anvil Mining, Cambior, and Copper Mesa, legal obstacles such as jurisdiction,

forum non conveniens and duty of care can prevent cases like these from being
tried on their merits in Canada. However, Choc v. HudBay may represent an important
change in course, at least with respect to duty of care.
As discussed above, the Ontario Superior Court has now acknowledged that parent
companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent harm
caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct control by
the Canadian parent corporation” (Choc v. HudBay 2013, paragraph 73). If the trial court
conﬁrms this ﬁnding, individuals alleging injury caused by Canadian mining operations
will have access to an enforceable mechanism of accountability. While the legal barriers
mentioned above and other barriers such as the cost of litigation and availability of
evidence will still exist, we may be at the beginning of a shift in judicial thinking on the
relationship between Canadian transnational corporations and the individuals at the
location of operations. Until such time as Guatemala’s judiciary is strengthened and is able
to act, the Canadian courts may be the most viable forum.14
In a globalised world, encouraging ethical behaviour cannot be left to a single
jurisdiction or a single institution. We hope that the time has come for Canadian courts to
begin to participate in creating the mechanisms necessary to close the gap in corporate
accountability.
A spokesperson for Chevron, referring to the Ecuadorian case, stated that “We’re
going to ﬁght this until hell freezes over. And then we’ll ﬁght it out on the ice”, to
which the Ontario Court of Appeal replied:

Chevron’s wish is granted. After all these years, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs deserve to have the
recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment heard on the merits in an appropriate
jurisdiction. At this juncture, Ontario is that jurisdiction. (Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation
2013, C.A., paragraphs 74 and 75)

In the words of retired Supreme Court of Canada judge Ian Binnie, “[a]pplying our law
to situations outside of our territory is contrary to our custom; but there are acts that are so
repugnant that they must force us to rethink our law” (Boisvert 2012).15
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See also North and Young (2013) and Keenan (2013).
This section is based in part on Imai, Mehranvar, and Sander (2007), section II.
At the time it was called International Nickel Company. It ofﬁcially changed its name to INCO
in 1976 (see McFarlane 1989).
Carlos Arana Osorio was elected as president in 1970, in what was referred to by McFarlane as
a “fraudulent election”. Upon his election, Arana stated that he would, if necessary, “turn the
country into a cemetery in order to pacify it” (McFarlane 1989, 130).
For example, Oliverio Castañeda de León, a member of the University Student
Association, was machine-gunned to death in broad daylight in front of hundreds of
witnesses, including police. The police did not attempt to chase or arrest the shooters
(Gerardi 1998).
Note that the ﬁrst evictions in November took place without a court order, which is required
by Guatemalan law (Paley 2007).
HudBay Minerals has indicated that the Canadian dollar is the company’s functional
currency. See Audited annual ﬁnancial statements – English, HudBay Minerals, dated 19
February 2014. All references to dollar amounts in relation to HudBay Minerals, unless
otherwise speciﬁed, refer to Canadian dollars.
The recent conviction at ﬁrst instance of Ríos Montt, Guatemala’s former military leader, in
Guatemalan Courts for genocide and crimes against humanity during the civil war represents
an important step in Guatemala’s ﬁght against impunity (UN News Center 2013a). However,
the verdict was annulled by the Constitutional Court a few days later (UN News Center
2013b).
For photos of Lote 9 see University of Northern British Columbia (2008).
Fontierras or “Fondo de Tierras” is a state entity responsible for keeping a registry of land
titles.
The courts of ﬁrst instance, or trial courts, are referred to this way, so that the Ninth Judge of
the Civil Trial Court refers to a judge at the Civil Trial level.
For a description of litigation in Canada and the Interamerican system, see North and Young
(2013).
Much of the conﬂict in and around Junin between farmers, the security forces, and the
mining community has been ﬁlmed by Malcolm Rogge in his documentary ﬁlm, Under
Rich Earth (see the website at http://underrichearth.ryecinema.com/?page_id=114).
There is signiﬁcant support for legislation in Canada that would provide accountability for the

15.

activities of extractive industries in other countries, but attempts at a legislative solution have
not been successful. For a full discussion, see Kamphuis (2012).
Author’s translation. Original: “Appliquer notre droit à des situations à l’extérieur de notre
territoire est contraire à nos conceptions; mais il y a des actes tellement répugnants qu’ils
doivent nous forcer à revoir nos conceptions du droit. Au XVIIIe siècle, la piraterie
posait une telle menace qu’on pouvait juger les pirates sans égard au lieu de leurs crimes”.

References
Anvil.
2005.
“Anvil
Annual
Report
2005.”
MMG
Limited.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:beBnt9djtYJ:www.anvilmining.com/ﬁles/2005-anvilannualreport.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=
clnk&gl=au
Association Canadienne Contre L’impunité (ACCI) c Anvil Mining Ltd. 2011. 2011 QCCS 1966.
Quebec Court of Appeal. http://canlii.ca/t/ﬂ6jl
Ball, Patrick, Paul Kobrak, and Herbert Spirer. 1999. State Violence in Guatemala, 1960–1996: A
Quantitative Reﬂection. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of
Science,
Scientiﬁc
Responsibility,
Human
Rights
&
Law
Program.
http://shr.aaas.org/projects/human_rights/gua- temala/report/Guatemala_en.pdf
Behrens, Susan Fitzpatrick. 2009. “Nickel for Your Life: Q’eqchi’ Communities Take On Mining
Companies in Guatemala.” North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) blog, 25
October 2009. https://nacla.org/node/6177.
Boisvert, Yves. 2012. “L’impunité de nos société minières.” La Presse, November 5.
http://www.lapresse.ca/ debats/chroniques/yves-boisvert/201211/04/01-4590272-limpunite-denos-societes-minieres.php
Bradbury, J. H. 1985. “International Movements and Crises in Resource Oriented Companies: The
Case of Inco in the Nickel Sector.” Economic Geography 61 (2): 129–143.
Caal v. HudBay. 2011. Caal v. HudBay Amended Statement of Claim.
http://www.chocversushudbay.com/ legal-documents
Cambior.
2004.
“Omai
2003/2004.”
http://web.archive.org/web/20050315144101/www.cambior.com/site/
english/operations/operations/fr_omai.htm
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 2011. “Unﬁnished Business.” Sunday Edition.
http://www.cbc.ca/ video/player.html?clipid=2141604355&position=990702&site=cbc.news.ca
Choc v. HudBay. 2010. Choc v HudBay, Second Amended Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.
http:// www.chocversushudbay.com/legal-documents
Choc v. HudBay. 2013. 2013 ONSC 1414. Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
www.chocversushudbay.com/ wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Judgment-July-22-2013-Hudbaysmotion-to-strike.pdf
CNN Money. 2006. “Cambior Inc: Omai Lawsuit Struck and Dismissed.” CNN Money.
http://money.cnn. com/news/newsfeeds/articles/marketwire/06178759.htm
Constitutional Court. 2011. Expediente 934-2010. Constitutional Court of Guatemala.
http://www.cc.gob.gt/ sjc/
CSR Counsellor. 2011. “Closing Report Request for Review File #2011-01-MEX.” Foreign Affairs,
Trade,
and
Development
Canada.
http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellorconseiller_rse/publications/ 2011-01-MEX_closing_rep-rap_ﬁnal.aspx
Chub v. HudBay. 2011. Chub v. HudBay; Amended Statement of Claim Filed October 26, 2011.
http://www. chocversushudbay.com/legal-documents
Civil
Code
of
Quebec.
Statutes
of
Quebec,
1991,
c.
64.
http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/sujets/ glossaire/code-civil-a.htm
Dashwood, Hevina S. 2012. The Rise of Global Corporate Social Responsibility: Mining and the
Spread of Global Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Department of Foreign Affairs. n.d. Ofﬁce of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) Counsellor. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
http://www.international. gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/index.aspx?view=d
Donoghue
v.
Stevenson.
1932.
1932
UKHL
100.
House
of
Lords.
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/ 1932/100.html
Driever, Steven. 1985. “The Role of Lateritic Nickel Mining in Latin American Countries with
Special Reference to Exmibal in Guatemala.” GeoJournal 11: 29–42.
Eslava, Luis. 2008. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Development: A Knot of

Disempowerment.”
Sortuz: Oñati Journal of Emergent Socio-legal Studies 2 (2): 43–71.
Gerardi, Monisgnor Juan. 1998. “Informe para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica:
Nunca Más” [Report for the Recovery of Historical Memory: Never Again]. Oﬁcina de
Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala. http://www.odhag.org.gt/03publicns.htm
Global
Reporting
Initiative.
n.d.
Global
Reporting
Initiative.
https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx
Grainger, Sarah. 2009. “Land Dispute Threatens Major Guatemala Nickel Project.” Reuters,
October 12. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1254892220091012
Grandia, Liza. 2006. “Unsettling: Land Dispossession and Enduring Inequity for the Q’eqchi’ Maya
in the Guatemalan and Belizean Frontier Colonization Process.” PhD diss., University of California
Berkeley.
Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clariﬁcation. 1999. “Guatemala: Memory of Silence.” AAAS.
http:// www.aaas.org/sites/default/ﬁles/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf
HudBay Minerals. n.d. “The Facts: Hudbay’s Former Operations in Guatemala.” HudBay.
http://www.hudbayminerals.com/English/Responsibility/CSR-Issues/The-facts-Hudbaysformer-operations-in-Guatemala/default.aspx
HudBay Minerals. 2008a. “Hudbay Minerals Completes Business Combination with Skye
Resources; Announces New Director and Chief Financial Ofﬁcer.” HudBay.
http://www.hudbayminerals.com/default.aspx?SectionId=5cc5ecae-6c48-4521-a1ad480e593e4835&LanguageId=1&PressReleaseId= c0e9ae5e-c314-4898-8008-137ec8d9c764
HudBay Minerals. 2008b. “Hudbay Reports Third Quarter Results.” HudBay.
http://www.hudbayminerals.com/English/Media-Centre/News-Releases/News-ReleaseDetails/2008/HudBay-Reports-Third- Quarter-Results/default.aspx
HudBay Minerals. 2009. “HudBay Minerals Provides Update on CGN.” HudBay. http://www.
hudbayminerals.com/English/Media-Centre/News-Releases/News-ReleaseDetails/2009/HudBay-Minerals-Provides-Update-on-CGN/default.aspx
HudBay Minerals. 2011. “HudBay Minerals Announces Completion of Sale of Fenix Project
and
Key
Management
Appointments.”
HudBay.
http://www.hudbayminerals.com/default.aspx?SectionId=5cc5ecae-6c48-4521-a1ad480e593e4835&LanguageId=1&PressReleaseId=c4c56f9d-8be7-4600-898f-3b07f7aa8eac
HudBay
Minerals.
2012.
2012
Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Report.
http://www.hudbayminerals.com/ﬁles/doc_downloads/csr/5961_Hudbay_CSR_2012_ENG.pdf
Imai, Shin, Ladan Mehranvar, and Jennifer Sander. 2007. “Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian
Mining in Guatemala.” Indigenous Law Journal 6: 101–139.
International Labour Organization. 2007. “Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the
Representation Alleging Non-observance by Guatemala of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention,
1989
(No.
169).”
International
Labour
Organization.
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::
NO:50012:P50012_COMPLAINT_PROCEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:2507321,en:NO
Kamphuis, Charis. 2012. “Canadian Mining Companies and Domestic Law Reform: A Critical
Legal Account.” German Law Journal 13 (9): 1456–1486.
Keenan, Karyn. 2013. “Commentary. Desperately Seeking Sanction: Canadian Extractive
Companies and their Public Partners.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 34 (1): 111–
121.
Klippensteins. n.d. Choc v. HudBay Minerals Inc. & Caal v. HudBay Minerals Inc. http://www.
chocversushudbay.com
Klippensteins. 2009. Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining Corporation. Statement of Claim. http://www.
ramirezversuscoppermesa.com
Krauss, Clifford. 2014. “Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador.” New York Times, March 4.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/federal-judge-rules-for-chevron-in-ecuadoreanpollution-case.html?_r=0
Lemco, Jonathan. 1986. “Canadian Foreign Policy Interests in Central America: Some Current
Issues.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (2): 119–146.
McFarlane, Peter. 1989. Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America. Toronto, ON:
Between the Lines.
Mining Association of Canada. 2011. “Toward Sustainable Mining”. Mining Association of Canada.
http:// www.mining.ca/towards-sustainable-mining
Mining Watch. 2010. “Class Action Filed Against Anvil Mining by Congolese Victims.” Mining
Watch Canada.
http://www.miningwatch.ca/article/class-action-ﬁled-against-anvil-miningcongolese-victims

Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2005. Report on the Conclusions of the Special
Investigation into Allegations of Summary Executions and Other Violations of Human
Rights Committed by the FARDC in Kilwa (Province of Katanga) on 15 October 2004.
Kinshasa:
United
Nations.
http://www.
abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/MONUC_report_oct05.pdf
North, Liisa, and Laura Young. 2013. “Generating Rights for Communities Harmed by Mining:
Legal and Other Action.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 34 (1): 96–110.
OECD. 2011. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Paris: Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf
Paley, Dawn. 2007. “This Is What Development Looks Like.” The Dominion.
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/ articles/900
Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining Corporation. 2011. 2011 Ontario Court of Appeal 191.
http://canlii.ca/t/ fkg76
Prensa Libre. 2012. “Militar Queda en Prisión por Asesinato de Adolfo Ich Chamán” [Soldier in
Prison for Murder of Adolfo Ich Chamán]. Prensa Libre, October 2.
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/
Militar-asesinato-Adolfo-IchChaman_0_784124821.html
Ramraj, Robert. n.d. “The Omai Disaster in Guyana.” Winston-Salem State University. http://www.
gammathetaupsilon.org/the-geographical-bulletin/2000s/volume43-2/article3.pdf
Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc. 1998. Q.J.No. 2554. Quebec Superior Court.
Available on Quicklaw.
Rittich, Kerry. 2006. “The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social.” In The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical
Appraisal, edited by David Trubek and Alvaro Santos, 203–252. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rodriguez, James. 2009. “Barrio La Union Leader Killed by CGN’s Security Agents in El Estor.”
MiMundo.
http://www.mimundo.org/2009/09/29/barrio-la-union-leader-killed-bycgn%E2%80%99s-security- agents-in-el-estor/
Sagebien, J., and N. Lindsay. 2011. Governance Ecosystems: CSR in the Latin American Mining
Sector.
Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
Skye Resources. 2007. “Land Occupations End at Fenix Project.” Schnoor v. Canada. http://www.
schnoorversuscanada.ca/docs/skye-pr.pdf
Supreme Court of Canada. 2014. Chevron Corporation, et al. v. Daniel Carlos Lusitande Yaiguaje,
et al., Docket number: 35682, Application for leave to appeal. http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/casedossier/info/ dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=35682
Trubek, David M. 2006. The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
United Nations. 2002. “Report of the United Nations Veriﬁcation Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)
for the Consultative Group Meeting for Guatemala.” United Nations Veriﬁcation Mission
in
Guatemala
(MINUGUA).
http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/gu/minugua_eng.pdf
United Nations. 2009a. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers,
Leandro
Despouy.”
A/HRC/11/41/Add.3.
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/125/ 63/PDF/G0912563.pdf?OpenElement
United Nations. 2009b. “Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, Addendum:
Follow-up
to
Country
Recommendations
Guatemala.”
A/HRC/11/2/Add.7.
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pdf_ state/G0913064.pdf
United Nations. 2011. “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.” A /HRC/17/31.
http://www. business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21mar-2011.pdf
University of Northern British Columbia. 2008. “El Estor.” Field Schools.
http://blogs.unbc.ca/ﬁeldschools/ 2008/05/07/el-estor/
UN News Center. 2013a. “Justice in Guatemala Vital for Preventing Recurrence of Heinous Crimes,
Say
UN
Experts.”
UN
News
Center.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44918&Cr=guatemala&
Cr1=#.UZutDLWmiAg
UN News Center. 2013b. “UN Human Rights Ofﬁce Urges Trial to Be Decided on Merits after
Guatemalan
Court Overturns Ríos Montt Conviction.” UN News Center.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=44993#.UaQl85zNkv0
US Department of State. 2012. “Guatemala 2012 Human Rights Report”. US Department of State.
http:// www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204454
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. n.d. “The Voluntary Principles are the Only
Human Rights Guidelines Designed Speciﬁcally for Extractive Sector Companies.”
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2013 ONCA 758 (CanLII). http://canlii.ca/t/g2dbp
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2013 ONSC 2527 (CanLII). http://canlii.ca/t/fxczj

